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Abstract 
The relationship between health and work is frequently investigated using self-assessments of 
disability from social surveys. The complication is that respondents may overstate their level 
of disability to justify non-employment and welfare receipt. This study provides new evidence 
on the existence and magnitude of justification bias by exploiting a novel feature of a large 
longitudinal survey: each wave respondents are asked identical disability questions twice; near 
the beginning and end of the face-to-face interview. Prior to answering the second disability 
question, respondents are asked a series of questions that increase the salience of their 
employment and welfare circumstances. Justification bias is identified by comparing the 
variation between the two measures within-individuals over time, with the variation in 
employment status over time. Results indicate substantial and statistically significant 
justification bias; especially for men and women who receive disability pensions.  
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the relationship between health and work is central to labor and health 
economics research and crucial for the design of health policies, social welfare systems, and 
strategies for productivity and growth. This relationship is often investigated using self-
assessments of health and disability from social surveys. However, there exists a legitimate 
concern that thresholds for reporting a work-limiting disability may vary systematically 
according to individual circumstances (Kapteyn et al. 2007). In particular, individuals without 
a paid job may overstate their health-related work limitations because of financial incentives, 
such as qualifying for a disability pension. It is also possible that social context and 
psychological factors compel the non-employed to use illness to rationalize their inability to 
fulfil a socially prescribed role (Shuval et al. 1973). This so called ‘justification bias’ implies 
that the estimated importance of health and disability on labor supply decisions is most likely 
inflated. To more precisely measure the role of health in economic decision making, it is 
therefore critical to ascertain the magnitude of justification bias and characterize the types of 
individuals for whom justification bias is largest. In this paper, we present new evidence on 
these issues.   
 Despite the long-running recognition and attention devoted to the issue of justification 
bias, there is conflicting evidence about its importance. In early investigations, Anderson and 
Burkhauser (1985, p.324) state “we are persuaded that self-reports of health are unsatisfactory 
measures”, while on the other hand, Stern (1989, p.392) concludes that “standard disability 
measures are powerful and reasonably exogenous predictors of labor force participation”. A 
decade later, Kerkhofs and  Lindeboom (1995) and Kreider (1999) find substantial over-
reporting of work limitations, whereas, Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) find no evidence in support 
of the justification hypothesis using an overall general self-assessed health indicator and only 
weak evidence of justification bias using self-reported work limitations. More recently, 
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Benítez-Silva et al. (2004, p.649) are “unable to reject the hypothesis that self-reported 
disability is an unbiased indicator”, while in contrast, Baker et al. (2004, p.1090) find “evidence 
that the error in self-reported chronic conditions is related to labor market status”, and the 
results in Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2009, p.1042) “show that justification bias is substantial 
and that failing to account for this may change estimation results considerably”. Further recent 
evidence on the importance of justification bias can be found in Gannon (2009), Datta Gupta 
and Larsen (2010), Datta Gupta and Jürges (2012), and Gosling and Saloniki (2014). 
 We contribute to this diverse literature by using an approach that differs from previous 
studies. We exploit a unique feature of an Australian longitudinal survey in which disability 
status is self-reported twice in each wave using identical questions – once at the beginning and 
once at the end of the face-to-face interview.1 This question identifies disabilities or health 
conditions that have lasted six months or more, restrict everyday activity, and cannot be 
corrected by medication. The second disability question is, however, preceded by a series of 
questions about employment and sources of income, including disability welfare. Therefore, it 
is likely that respondents are inadvertently ‘primed’ to consider these issues when reporting 
disability the second time. How survey design can induce or exacerbate misreporting of health 
and disability has received little acknowledgement in the justification bias literature, but it has 
been shown that responses to life evaluation questions are extremely sensitive to question-order 
effects (Deaton, 2012). Priming has also been used in economic experiments to increase the 
salience of certain concepts and issues (Benjamin et al., 2010; Callen et al., 2014; Cohn et al., 
2015). 
                                                 
1  Previous studies have exploited repeated health questions in surveys to investigate reporting bias and 
heterogeneity; see Crossley and Kennedy (2002), Clarke and Ryan (2006) and Lumsdaine and Exterkate (2013). 
In these studies the questions regard general health (rather than disability status) and either the survey mode (i.e. 
face-to-face versus self-completion), question wording, or available response options differ between the two 
survey questions. In addition, none of the studies use longitudinal data. 
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The second novel feature of our approach is that we fully utilize the panel dimension 
of our data by estimating fixed-effects (FE) regression models. Essentially, we investigate how 
within-individual changes in the variation between the two self-reported disability measures 
correlate with within-individual changes in employment status. This modelling approach 
allows us to control for all time-invariant factors that influence reporting behavior, such as 
survey design and cognitive ability. 
 The FE results demonstrate that non-employed respondents and disability pension 
recipients are significantly more likely to exaggerate their level of disability. For example, we 
find that conditional on the response to the disability question at the beginning of the interview, 
unemployed and out of labor force (OLF) males are 3.1 and 6.6 percentage points respectively 
more likely to report a disability at the end of the interview than are employed males. The 
corresponding effects are smaller for females (2.2 and 2.6 percentage points respectively). For 
men and women, effect sizes are larger for respondents receiving disability pension payments 
(including employed pension recipients), but are still substantial and statistically significant for 
unemployed and OLF respondents not receiving pensions. 
 
2. Causes of Justification Bias 
Justification bias is a form of state-dependent reporting, whereby the reporting of self-assessed 
disability (or health) is systematically related to one’s employment status. Most commonly, 
justification bias is the tendency for non-employed individuals to over-report their disability 
level, relative to their true or latent disability, in order to rationalize their economic inactivity. 
One potential motivation for this behavior is financial. For example, respondents who are 
fraudulently collecting disability-related welfare payments may overstate their disability. This 
inflation of self-reported disability may be motivated by a fear that their survey responses could 
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be used by officials to re-assess their welfare eligibility. 2  Moreover, even if respondents 
understand that social surveys are not designed to assess or monitor welfare eligibility, they 
may feel a social desire to justify their welfare receipt to the interviewer. 
 Another possible cause of justification bias is the desire to conform to socially accepted 
norms associated with different states of employment (Myers 1982). This desire induces 
inadvertent subtle changes of thresholds for equating poor health with a disability. For example, 
an employed respondent suffering migraines may not usually consider themselves as having a 
work-limiting disability, but after they become non-employed, their threshold for what they 
consider a work-limiting disability decreases and their assessment changes. 3  Another less 
conventional example is when an employed respondent under-reports their true disability. The 
social norm that workers are physically robust and capable of performing their paid roles can 
lead employed respondents to increase their disability reporting threshold. 
 Related to both the financial and social causes is the desire by respondents to present 
themselves in the best possible light during interviews. This drives respondents to exaggerate 
socially desirable behaviors or characteristics and underreport those that are less desirable. This 
is known as social desirability bias (Bowling 2005). In our context, non-employed respondents 
(regardless of whether they receive a disability pension or not) may feel that a disability (or ill 
health) is a more socially acceptable reason for non-employment than either their failure to find 
employment or their choice to not work. Therefore, whether they are unemployed, early retired 
or out of labor force for other reasons, respondents who feel a social obligation to be working 
                                                 
2 Parsons (1982, p.83) observed that “The self-rated poor health group will be composed of two distinct subsets: 
those who would rate themselves in poor health in an incentive-neutral environment, and those who are induced 
by the economic environment to declare themselves in poor health.” 
3 This mechanism is based partially on the concept that “disability” is not an objective binary health state, but 
more so a categorization that is based on self, doctor, or government evaluations and definitions. As Autor and 
Duggan (2006; p.85) write: “While certain medical conditions are clearly disabling, “disability” is not a medical 
condition. Disability is a dividing line (or zone) chosen by policymakers on a continuum of ailments affecting 
claimants’ capability to engage in paying work and their pain and discomfort in doing so”, and “Beyond the subset 
of clearly incapacitating medical and mental disorders, the extent of “disability” is ultimately a variable 
determined by policy.” 
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may inflate their level of disability. We would expect that this behavior is more likely to occur 
if the respondent’s employment status is at the forefront of their mind or if they are conscious 
of the interviewer knowing their employment status.  
 The use of illness to legitimize one’s failure to fulfil a socially prescribed role has been 
recognized for some time (Shuval et al. 1973). However, we still know very little about how 
the social pressure to justify non-employment varies across individuals, and in turn how this 
may lead to heterogeneity in justification bias. Given the traditional gender roles around 
providing income for the family, we may expect greater social pressure on males to use poor 
health as a reason for not working. Indeed males have been the sole focus in many studies that 
examine justification bias (e.g. Lindeboom and Kerkhofs 2009). While few studies have 
explicitly examined gender differences, there is some evidence to suggest that over-reporting 
of disability among non-workers (aged 50-64) is higher for women than men (Kreider 1999). 
This suggests that other, less obvious, social pressures may also be playing a role, and that 
further investigation into gender differences is important.   
We may also expect to see differences in the tendency for justification bias by age, 
ethnicity, and education level. For example, non-employment may be more socially acceptable 
among older individuals near retirement age, than among younger individuals in the prime of 
their working lives. Cultural norms about contributing to household income and accepting 
welfare may differ, and therefore we may expect heterogeneity in justification bias by ethnicity 
or country of birth.  Social class, often measured by education level, may also influence the 
social pressure felt by individuals to justify their non-employment.  
Another factor that may influence justification bias is the rate of unemployment in an 
individual’s area. There is some evidence that self-rated general health of the long-term 
unemployed is better in high unemployment regions, and worse in regions with low rates of 
unemployment (Whitehead et al. 2005). Therefore, in areas where unemployment is high, and 
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consequently more commonplace to be non-employed, individuals may feel less social pressure 
to justify their inactivity.  
 
3. Methods and Data 
3.1. Empirically Identifying Justification Bias 
Our aim is to estimate the likelihood that two individuals in different employment states, but 
with identical ‘true’ health, report different disability status. This estimate would be easily 
obtained if individuals’ ‘true’ health was observable; however, to the best of our knowledge, 
no such data exists. 4  One alternative second-best approach is to conduct a randomized 
experiment. In such an experiment the treated sample would be ‘primed’ to consider their 
employment status prior to answering the disability question. Through such a process, the 
treated individuals’ affiliation with their employment-related identity is increased (made more 
salient), causing their behavior to shift towards that identity’s norms (Benjamin et al., 2016). 
Importantly, the employment priming effects are interesting not only because of their direct 
influence on disability reporting behavior, but also because they are informative about the 
norms associated with different employment states, such as a disability norm for out-of-the-
labor-force (OLF) men (Benjamin et al., 2016).5  
 Our approach is similar to the imagined random experiment. Within the longitudinal 
HILDA survey, which is described in Section 3.2, each year respondents are asked an identical 
disability question twice by the same interviewer, under the same conditions, within 
                                                 
4 A close approximate to ‘true’ health could be obtained through a comprehensive medical examination of each 
surveyed individual at the time of the survey (potentially including a full physical and mental examination, blood 
sample, urine sample, and x-rays). Unfortunately, administrative medical records would typically be insufficient 
for measuring ‘true’ health, due to the possibility of undiagnosed health problems, and diagnoses that occurred in 
time periods or in jurisdictions not included in the records.  
5 A work-related priming example is Cohn et al. (2014), who increase the salience of bank employees’ professional 
identity by asking seven questions about their professional background, such as “At which bank are you presently 
employed?” and “What is your function at this bank?”. Treated employees behaved more dishonestly in a coin 
tossing task than control employees. See Cohn and Maréchal (2016) for a review of the literature that uses priming 
to study economic questions. 
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approximately 30 minutes. In between the two questions, respondents are asked questions 
about their employment status and income sources. We interpret these intervening questions as 
a form of priming, as they likely increase the salience of respondents’ employment and welfare 
states, and cause respondents to respond to subsequent questions in a manner consistent with 
the social norms of their employment status.  Given this priming, we expect that non-employed 
respondents are more likely than employed respondents to change their answer and report that 
they do have a disability when asked the second time. We interpret such behavior as evidence 
of justification bias.6 
 Importantly, this approach requires two key assumptions: (i) respondents’ interpretation 
and understanding of each disability question is identical, and (ii) respondents’ information 
regarding their own health when answering each question is identical. This latter assumption 
would be violated if, for example, the respondent had initially forgotten about their disability, 
but had remembered it by the second disability question, perhaps because of intervening 
questions. We are confident that these two assumptions hold for three reasons. First, the two 
questions are identical, and for both questions, the survey respondent is handed the same 
‘Showcard’ to read that explains the criteria for having a disability, and a long list of potential 
causes, such as “hearing problems”, “chronic or recurring pain”, and “any condition that 
restricts physical activity or physical work (e.g. back problems, migraines)” (Appendix A 
includes a copy of the Showcard). Presumably the list of various health conditions and 
disabilities are helpful in triggering a respondent’s memory. Second, the same interviewer 
within the same interview (the same sitting) verbally asks both questions. For this reason we 
                                                 
6 There may be many respondents who are significantly influenced by the survey priming who do not change their 
disability self-assessment, because their self-assessed health status does not cross their (new) disability threshold. 
If our measure was instead ordinal (as is sometimes used within the literature), we may have observed greater 
changes in self-assessed disability. For example, Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2009) examine the disability question, 
‘Does your health limit you in the kind and the amount of work that you can do?’, which allows four possible 
responses: causes no problems, causes some problems, causes severe difficulties; and makes it impossible to work. 
Using this example, survey priming may induce changes from ‘causes no problems’ to ‘causes some problems’, 
however, it is unlikely that the analysis of our binary measure will identify such changes. 
 9 
 
can rule-out possible violations due to survey mode effects, which have been shown to impact 
upon response consistency (e.g. Crossley and Kennedy, 2002). Third, the second question is 
asked approximately 30 minutes after the first, which means it is implausible that a change in 
respondents’ true health status or new information received about their health status could be 
driving our results. Note also that there are no health-related survey questions between the two 
disability questions. 
 An additional threat to the validity of our approach is the possibility that the intervening 
survey questions alter respondent reporting behavior in ways that are unrelated to a change in 
the salience of current employment and welfare states. For example, answering numerous 
survey questions may reduce the respondent’s short-term cognitive resources, or alternatively 
the respondent may become more comfortable in revealing sensitive information. Fortunately, 
we are able to control for these alternative ‘treatments’ using the longitudinal aspect of our 
data. Specifically, we estimate individual fixed-effects models, in which the non-employment 
effects on disability reporting are identified from those respondents who have had a change in 
employment status. Because the survey design stays constant across survey waves, the 
alternative survey ‘treatments’ are effectively differenced out. Results from falsification tests 
support this approach. For example, if respondents become more comfortable in revealing their 
disability status as the interview progresses, we would expect respondents to increasingly 
report both work-limiting and non-work-limiting disabilities. However, we find statistically 
insignificant, near-zero estimated effects for non-work-limiting disabilities. 7 
 It is important to also note that null estimated effects should not be interpreted as 
evidence against the existence of justification bias. There will be no difference between 
unprimed (question one) and primed (question two) reporting behavior if the respondent always 
                                                 
7  Interview conditions can vary across waves, however, results from individual fixed-effects models that 
additionally include interviewer-level fixed-effects and interview-timing fixed-effects (e.g. interview month, day 
of the week and time of day) are very similar to our main results. 
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feels the need to justify their employment status. The likely presence of these ‘consistent 
justifiers’ within our sample will therefore lead to an underestimate of the extent of justification 
bias. Fortunately, we are able to investigate this issue by comparing self-reported disability 
status with partner-reported disability status in a sub-sample of respondents whose disability 
status is initially reported by their partner. Cohabitating partners and married spouses (which 
we collectively term ‘partners’) are ordinarily aware of serious, long-term, untreatable 
conditions suffered by their partners, but are less likely to feel the need to justify their partners’ 
non-employment than their partners themselves. The limitation of using partner reports is that 
they are less likely to satisfy the assumptions discussed above. That is, it is more likely that the 
interpretation and understanding of the disability question will differ between partners. 
  
3.2. The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey 
We use data from 12 waves of the HILDA Survey, an ongoing nationally-representative 
longitudinal study of Australian households that began in 2001. Wave 1 contained a sample of 
19,914 panel members from 7,682 households, and in each following year members of these 
households have been followed-up, along with new household members resulting from changes 
in the composition of the original household and new households from the wave 11 top-up 
sample. Data from each year includes detailed information on income, employment, health and 
other demographic and socio-economic information.8 The survey comprises three face-to-face 
survey instruments – Household Form, Household Questionnaire, and Person Questionnaire – 
and a confidential self-completion questionnaire.  
Disability status is first elicited in the Household Form, which we label throughout as 
Questionnaire 1 (Q1). Q1 is an initial face-to-face questionnaire designed to record basic 
                                                 
8 The household response rates range from 87.0 per cent in wave 2 to 70.8 per cent in wave 11, while the household 
response rates for those households responding in the previous wave ranges from 87.0 per cent in wave 2 to 96.4 
per cent in wave 11 (Summerfield et al., 2012). 
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information about each member of the household before commencing the detailed 
questionnaires. It is administered to one adult member of the household, which can vary from 
wave-to-wave, and takes on- average 6 minutes to complete. Among partnered respondents, 
Q1 is more often completed by female partners (around 60% of cases). Most significantly, the 
Q1 respondent is asked the following question: “does anyone here have any long-term health 
condition, disability or impairment such as these?”, and is shown a card with the description 
“Disabilities/health conditions which have lasted, or are likely to last, 6 months or more; restrict 
everyday activity; and cannot be corrected by medication or medical aids” followed by a list 
of 17 types of disability.9 The Q1 respondent answers “yes” or “no” for all household members, 
starting with him- or her-self. 
 Disability status is subsequently elicited in the Person Questionnaire, which we label 
throughout as Questionnaire 2 (Q2). Q2 is the main survey instrument and is administered face-
to-face to every member of the household aged 15 years and over. It takes on-average 33 
minutes to complete and contains sections on family background, education, employment, 
income, family formation, and health, with the health section occurring near the end of the 
questionnaire. At the very beginning of the health section, respondents are presented with a 
disability card identical to that used in Q1 (same description and list of disability types), and 
are asked whether they have any long-term health condition, impairment, or disability. Again, 
they can only answer “yes” or “no”. If the respondent answers “yes”, they are then asked which 
of the 17 disabilities they have (multiple types can be provided) and whether the condition 
                                                 
9 The 17 disability types are: Sight problems not corrected by glasses or contact lenses; Hearing problems; Speech 
problems; Blackouts, fits or loss of consciousness; Difficulty learning or understanding things; Limited use of 
arms or fingers; Difficulty gripping things; Limited use of feet or legs; A nervous or emotional condition which 
requires treatment; Any condition that restricts physical activity or physical work (e.g. back problems, migraines); 
Any disfigurement or deformity; Any mental illness which requires help or supervision; Shortness of breath or 
difficulty breathing; Chronic or recurring pain; Long-term effects as a result of a head injury, stroke or other brain 
damage; A long-term condition or ailment which is still restrictive even though it is being treated or medication 
is being taken for it; Any other long-term condition such as arthritis, asthma, heart disease, Alzheimer’s disease, 
dementia etc. 
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limits the “type of work or the amount of work you can do?” These follow-up questions were 
not asked in Q1. 
Within each wave of HILDA, each respondents’ disability status is therefore measured 
twice (in Q1 and Q2). Q1 is either self-reported (64% of cases) or partner-reported (36% of 
cases), while Q2 is always self-reported.10 In our analyses, we primarily use the sub-sample of 
respondents with two self-reports. We are unaware of any comparable data set that repeatedly 
asks identical disability or health questions using the same survey mode, especially not 
consistently across waves. HILDA data therefore provide a unique opportunity to investigate 
reporting heterogeneity in self-reported disability.  
 
3.3. Descriptive Results 
Table 1 presents the proportions of working-age individuals (aged 18-60 years) who have a 
disability according to self-reports in Q1 and Q2. The disability rates are also presented for 
three employment states: employed (E), unemployed (U) and out-of-the-labor-force (OLF). A 
respondent is defined as unemployed if they want to work, and are actively looking for work 
or available to start work within four weeks. The OLF category includes respondents who do 
not want to work, and respondents who want to work but are not actively looking and are not 
available to start work. This category includes persons who are retired, homemakers, carers, 
disabled, travelling / on holiday, and volunteers.11 
The summary statistics reveal several interesting features of the data. First, self-reported 
disability rates are around 20 percentage points for both males and females, which is similar to 
the United States (Kreider and Pepper, 2008). Second, Q1 disability rates are lower than Q2 
disability rates. Third, the absolute differences between Q1 and Q2 disability rates are larger 
                                                 
10 Other in-frequent combinations also occur, e.g. a parent may be the Q1 respondent. We do not use these 
combinations in our analyses. 
11 Given our focus on employment, students are excluded from the sample. 
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for unemployed and OLF respondents than for employed respondents. For example, the 
percentage point differences for men equal 1.5, 3.9 and 4.5 for employed, unemployed and 
OLF, respectively. There is not, however, a similar employment gradient in the proportional 
differences between the Q1 and Q2 disability rates.  
Figure 1 illustrates the extent of variation between the self-reported Q1 and Q2 
measures. Specifically, Figure 1A presents the probability of reporting a disability in Q2, 
conditional on not reporting a disability in Q1: 𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄2 = 1|𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄1 = 0) . If reporting was 
consistent across Q1 and Q2, we would expect the rates to be near zero, but instead we observe 
a remarkable pattern. Figure 1A shows that the propensity for male respondents to change their 
assessment and report a disability in Q2 increases sharply with non-employment. Conditional 
on a previous self-report of no disability in Q1, the Q2 disability rates equal 5% for employed, 
11% for unemployed, and 21% for OLF. In contrast, the gradient is nearly flat for women. The 
male pattern suggests that having to rationalize non-employment significantly decreases non-
employed men’s thresholds for equating poor health with a disability.  
Figure 1B presents the opposite variation; the probability of not reporting a disability 
in Q2, conditional on reporting a disability in Q1:  𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄2 = 0|𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄1 = 1). The figure again 
shows a steep gradient, but in the reverse direction, and for both men and women. Conditional 
on a previous self-report of an existing disability in Q1, the probability of not reporting a 
disability in Q2 equals 20% for employed men, 7% for unemployed men and 3% for OLF men. 
The corresponding figures for women equal 17%, 9% and 6%. These patterns suggest that 
having to detail employment conditions, significantly increases employed respondents’ 
thresholds for equating poor health with a disability.12 
                                                 
12 For completeness, in Appendix Figure B1 we present the graphs that show the conditional probabilities of 
consistent reporting of disability status (by employment status and gender). 
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Table 2 presents estimates of individual characteristics that predict variation between 
the Q1 and Q2 self-reported measures. Using a multinomial logit specification, we model the 
four mutually exclusive, joint disability outcomes: (1) 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄1 = 0,𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄2 = 0 (no-no); (2) 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄1 =
1, 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄2 = 1  (yes-yes); (3) 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄1 = 0,𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄2 = 1  (no-yes); and (4) 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄1 = 1,𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄2 = 0  (yes-no). 
Average partial effect estimates are presented for the two inconsistent outcomes (no-yes and 
yes-no).13 The results show that non-employed men and women are significantly more likely 
to answer “no” on Q1 and “yes” in Q2, than their employed counterparts. For men the estimated 
differences equal 2.1 percentage points for unemployed and 3.4 percentage points for OLF. 
These effects are large compared to other significant predictors in the model, such as age (0.1 
percentage points per year), university degree (-1.9 percentage points), Australian-born (1.1 
percentage points), and comprehension issues (2.6 percentage points). The corresponding 
estimated effects on the converse yes-no outcome are small and statistically insignificant.  
Equivalent multinomial logit marginal effect estimates are presented in Appendix Table 
B2 for the sample of respondents with partner-reported Q1 disability status (Q1 partner-
reported, Q2 self-reported). The estimates again show that unemployed and OLF respondents 
are significantly more likely to have a no-yes outcome than are employed respondents. The 
effect sizes are slightly larger than in Table 2. For example, the estimated effects for 
unemployed and OLF men equal 3.5 and 5.9 percentage points, respectively. 
The descriptive results presented in this subsection suggest that changes in the 
likelihood of reporting a disability are associated with employment status. However, these 
results are unlikely to reflect the true extent of justification bias. As explained in Section 3.1, 
the questions between Q1 and Q2 may alter how respondents answer Q2 in ways that are 
unrelated to an increase in the salience of respondents’ employment and welfare states. To 
                                                 
13 Average partial effect estimates for the two consistent outcomes (no-no and yes-yes) are presented in 
Appendix Table B1. 
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control for these effects, we rely on within-individual variation over time in the difference 
between responses to Q1 and Q2.  
 
4. Main Results 
As discussed above, our methodological approach involves comparing the variation between 
self-reported disability status in Q1 (recorded at the beginning of the survey) and Q2 (recorded 
at the end of the survey) over time, with the variation in employment status over time. We do 
this by estimating fixed-effects linear probability regression models: 
 
  𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄2 = 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄1 + 𝐸′𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛿 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄2
 is disability status from Q2, 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑄1
 is disability status from Q1, 𝐸𝑖𝑡  is a vector of 
employment and welfare states, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a vector of additional control variables
14 , 𝛼𝑖  is an 
individual-level fixed-effect, 𝜇𝑡  is a time fixed-effect, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is a random error term. 
Statistically significant positive effects of non-employment on self-reported disability are then 
interpreted as evidence of justification bias.  
 Estimates of 𝛽 and 𝛾 from equation (1) are reported separately by gender in columns 
(1) and (3) of Table 3. In Panel (A) the employment vector includes indicators of being 
unemployed and out of the labor force (OLF). In Panel (B) employment status is interacted 
with current Disability Support Pension (DSP) receipt, with ‘Employed without DSP’ used as 
the omitted category.15 As background information, in Australia 16-64 year-olds are eligible 
                                                 
14  The control variable set includes a quadratic function in age, having dependent children, and interview 
conditions (being suspicious about the study or uncooperative; comprehension issues, such as, poor eyesight or 
hearing, reading difficulties, or language issues; being interviewed in follow-up fieldwork period; needing more 
than four calls to complete all interviews; and length of the interview).  
15 Between the Q1 and Q2 disability measures, respondents are asked whether they currently receive the Disability 
Support Pension (DSP) and how much they received in their most recent payment. We use this self-reported 
information to construct the DSP indicator. 
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for the DSP if they have a physical, intellectual, or psychiatric condition that prevents them 
from working 15 hours or more per week within the next 2 years. In our sample time-frame, 
eligibility was based on a report from the claimant’s doctor. The maximum fortnightly DSP 
payment for singles without children equals A$782, which is substantially higher than the 
unemployment benefit (A$519).16 DSP recipients may work up to 30 hours per week and 
continue to receive a part pension. 
 Column (1) of Table 3 shows that conditional on self-reported disability from Q1, 
unemployed men are 3.1 percentage points and OLF men are 6.6 percentage points more likely 
to report a disability in Q2 than are employed men. The corresponding estimates for women in 
Column (3) equal 2.2 percentage points and 2.6 percentage points. The estimates of 𝛽, the 
coefficient on self-reported Q1 disability equal 0.538 to 0.590 for males and females, 
respectively, which shows that the two disability self-reports are correlated, but not perfectly 
so.17 Appendix Table B3 presents the estimated effects of the control variables, most of which 
are not statistically significant. The probability of reporting a disability in Q2 is higher for 
respondents who have had comprehension issues during the interview or taken longer to 
complete Q2. Females with dependent children and older men are also less likely to report a 
disability in Q2.  
The estimates in Panel (B) indicate that the effects are particularly large for respondents 
receiving the DSP: employed, unemployed and OLF male DSP recipients are 9.3 percentage 
points, 14.4 percentage points and 14.2 percentage points more likely than employed men not 
receiving the DSP to report a Q2 disability, conditional on Q1 disability status. The effects are 
similarly large for female DSP recipients. Importantly, the estimates are also statistically 
significant for unemployed and OLF men and women who do not receive the DSP. This 
                                                 
16 For more information see www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/disability-support-
pension and http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/newstart-allowance.  
17 Hausman test confirms that the fixed-effects model is the appropriate estimator. It rejects the equality of 
random-effects and fixed-effects models for both genders and specifications (p-values < 0.0005). 
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suggests that social (and not solely financial) incentives triggered by the employment ‘priming’ 
questions are likely to play an important role in the inflation of disability status. We can be 
quite confident that non-employed non-DSP recipients are unlikely to be truly disabled. This 
is because DSP payments are substantially higher than unemployment benefit (UB) payments, 
and involve considerably fewer obligations to maintain eligibility (Saunders, 2007). Therefore, 
truly disabled non-employed individuals have a strong incentive to apply for the DSP.  
In columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 we report estimates using an alternative dependent 
variable. After the main disability question in Q2, respondents are asked whether the condition 
limits the “type of work or the amount of work you can do?” Respondents who respond ‘yes’ 
are considered to have a ‘work-limiting disability’, and respondents who respond ‘no’ are 
considered to have a ‘non-work limiting disability’. If respondents are primed by the questions 
regarding employment and welfare receipt, the estimated effects of non-employment on work 
limiting conditions should be especially large. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 shows that all 
the ‘work-limiting disability’ estimates are larger than the corresponding ‘any disability’ 
estimates. For example, the estimates for OLF respondents not receiving DSP increase from 
6.4 to 8.9 percentage points for men, and from 2.2 to 3.3 percentage points for women. 
Moreover, the estimated effects are remarkably large for non-employed men receiving DSP. 
Conditional on self-reported disability from Q1, these men are almost 20 percentage points 
more likely to report a work-limiting disability in Q2, than are employed men not receiving 
DSP. 
In contrast to the large estimates shown in Columns (2) and (4), the estimated effects 
of non-employment and DSP receipt on the probability of reporting a ‘non-work-limiting 
condition’, compared to no disability, are all small and statistically insignificant. Specifically, 
the estimated effects for unemployed and OLF men equal -0.004 (t-statistic = -0.46) and -0.012 
(t-statistic = -0.73), and the estimated effects for unemployed and OLF women equal -0.001 (t-
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statistic = -0.19) and <0.0005 (t-statistic = 0.09); these results are not shown in Table 3, but are 
available upon request. The null results for non-work-limiting conditions are encouraging, 
because they suggest that alternative explanations for our findings – for example, that 
respondents become more comfortable in revealing true disabilities as the interview progresses 
– are unlikely, because if this were the case, we would expect to also observe increased 
reporting of non-work limiting conditions. 
It is also reassuring that the pattern of results shown in Table 3 is duplicated when 
alternative identification approaches are utilized. In Table 4 we replicate the specifications 
from Table 3, but instead rely on the sub-sample of respondents whose disability status is 
initially reported by their partner. As discussed in Section 3.1, cohabitating partners and 
married spouses are less likely to feel the need to justify their partners’ non-employment than 
their partners themselves, and so therefore, the estimated effects using this sample may be less 
attenuated by respondents who justify in both Q1 and Q2. Overall, the results in Table 4 are 
very similar to those in Table 3, with the main exception being that the effect of DSP receipt 
for women seems less important. For example, the estimated effect for female OLF DSP 
recipients decreases from 0.103 (in Table 3) to 0.020 (in Table 4). Another alternative 
modelling approach is to condition the sample on self-reported Q1 disability status rather than 
to include it as a covariate (as in Table 3). Again, the results from this approach are similar to 
those shown in Table 3 (see Appendix Table B4). In this case, however, the biggest exception 
is that the estimated effects of DSP receipt are larger.18 
 
5. Exploring Heterogeneity 
5.1. Type of Disabling Condition 
                                                 
18 To further test the robustness of the estimates shown in Table 3, we have estimated fixed-effect models using 
subsamples of single respondents. For singles, Q1 is necessarily self-reported and therefore the estimated non-
employment effects cannot be driven by bias from non-random selection of Q1 respondents. The estimates for 
singles are very close in magnitude to those from Table 3 (results available upon request). 
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After the main disability question in Q2, respondents are asked which of the 17 conditions they 
have. We use answers to this question to construct five categories representing the most 
frequently chosen, identifiable conditions: (1) mental health conditions; (2) limited use of limbs; 
(3) condition restricting physical activity; (4) chronic or recurring pain; and (5) hearing and 
sight problems.19 Reported conditions not examined here are those that are rarely chosen (e.g. 
speech problems) and the catch-all options (e.g. any other long-term condition).  
 Column (1) of Table 5 shows that conditional on self-reported disability from Q1, 
unemployed men are 1.9 percentage points and OLF men are 7.3 percentage points more likely 
to report a mental health condition than are employed men. Relative to sample mean levels, 
these effects are far larger than for any other condition type. One potential explanation for this 
result is that there is variation across conditions in the effect that priming has on reductions in 
individuals’ disability thresholds. It is probable that workers with poor mental health are less 
likely to consider themselves disabled than are workers with poor physical health, and are also 
more likely to continue working (leading to the often discussed issue of presenteeism). 
Consequently, individuals with poor mental health reduce their disability thresholds to a larger 
extent when they transition from employment to non-employment, even without a 
corresponding change in true mental health. The non-employment effects are also statistically 
significant for ‘limited use of limbs’, ‘condition restricting physical activity’ and ‘chronic or 
recurring pain’. The non-employment effects for ‘hearing and sight problems’ are small and 
statistically insignificant.  
 For females the estimated effects are also largest for the ‘mental health condition’ 
category: unemployed women are 2.6 percentage points and OLF women are 3.0 percentage 
                                                 
19 The specific conditions comprising the five categories are: (1) “A nervous or emotional condition which 
requires treatment” and “Any mental illness which requires help or supervision”; (2) “Limited use of arms or 
fingers”, “Difficulty gripping things” and “limited use of feet or legs”; (3) “Any condition that restricts physical 
activity or physical work (e.g. back problems, migraines)”; (4) “Chronic or recurring pain”; (5) “Hearing problems” 
and “Sight problems not corrected by glasses or contact lenses”. 
 20 
 
points more likely to report a mental health condition than employed women (conditional on 
Q1 disability). 20 The estimated effects for the categories ‘limited use of limbs’ and ‘condition 
restricting physical activity’ are also large for women, largely mirroring the results for men. 
Appendix Table B5 shows that disability pension receipt increases the probability of reporting 
all health conditions for both men and women, but the likelihood of reporting a mental health 
condition increases most. Appendix Table B6 shows that for men the results remain robust 
when we use spouse-reports of disability in Q1, but no statistically significant effects are found 
for women.  
The comparatively large effect sizes on the ‘mental health condition’ category, which 
is comprised of the two conditions “a nervous or emotional condition which requires treatment” 
and “any mental illness which requires help or supervision”, are particularly interesting given 
the very large increases over time in the proportions of individuals receiving disability pensions 
for mental ill-health. The proportion of Australian Disability Support Pension recipients listing 
a psychological or psychiatric condition as their primary medical condition has risen from 23% 
in 2001 to 31% in 2013.21 The growth in disability pension receipt for mental ill-health has also 
been documented in other developed countries. For example, Autor and Duggan (2006) show 
that in the US the proportion of Disability Insurance (DI) Awards for the diagnosis group 
‘mental disorders’ has risen from 16% in 1983 to 25% in 2003.  
 
5.2. Individual and local area characteristics  
                                                 
20 The strong mental health results for both genders are not driven by respondents becoming more comfortable in 
reporting sensitive information (such as potentially stigmatized mental ill-health) throughout the interview. The 
estimated effects for work-limiting mental health conditions are even larger, while the estimated effects for non-
work limiting mental health conditions are small and statistically insignificant.  
21 The top 5 most commonly claimed for conditions in 2013 are: (1) psychological / psychiatric (31%); (2) 
musculo-skeletal and connective tissue (26%); (3) intellectual / learning (12%); (4) nervous system (5%); and (5) 
circulatory system (4%). The distribution of primary medical conditions is similar for both sexes. For more 
information see the 2013 report by the Australian Government Department of Social Services on “Characteristics 
of Disability Support Pension Recipients”, available at www.dss.gov.au. 
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As discussed in Section 2, some groups of individuals may be more likely to justify non-
employment than others. In particular, social norms, either self-imposed or reflecting the views 
of society, may play an important role. As may susceptibility to social desirability bias: the 
desire by respondents to present themselves in the best possible light during interviews.  In this 
subsection, we explore the heterogeneity in justification behavior by age, country of birth, 
educational attainment, and local area unemployment rate. The results are presented in Table 
6. In each regression, we interact the non-employment variables (and Q1 self-reported 
disability status) with a particular characteristic.22 
Panel (A) presents results for younger (<40) and older (≥40) respondents. Non-
employment is often more socially acceptable among older individuals, who are approaching 
retirement, than among younger individuals, and so we expect effects to be larger for 
respondents aged < 40. Overall, there is not strong support for this hypothesis in our data; 
though the effect for OLF young men is especially high (= 0.094). More generally, these results 
show that justification behavior is prevalent among individuals of all ages.  
 Given the potential importance of cultural norms regarding work, we expect to observe 
some heterogeneity by country of birth. In Panel (B) we split the sample in to those born in 
non-English speaking (NES) and English speaking (ES) countries. For men, the estimated 
effects are significantly different between these two groups. The effects for unemployed and 
OLF men born in English speaking countries are large and statistically significant (0.036 and 
0.070, respectively), while the effects for unemployed and OLF men born in non-English 
speaking countries are smaller and statistically insignificant (-0.001 and 0.037, respectively). 
It is difficult to isolate the cause of these differences. Interestingly, there exists a stronger belief 
                                                 
22 We have also tested whether there are significant differences between newer and more experienced respondents, 
motivated by the possibility that experienced respondents are more likely to trust the HILDA survey, and therefore 
feel more comfortable revealing sensitive or stigmatized information. Whether using a cutoff of 3 years or 6 years 
within the HILDA study to define ‘experienced’, we do not find significant differences in effect sizes across 
experience levels.   
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among NES men that it is their duty to work: NES men are more likely to rate the following 
statements as important benefits of paid work: “economic independence (a useful way to serve 
society)”, “not having to be reliant on the Government for income support”, and “being able to 
contribute to the financial costs of maintaining a household.” Therefore, it is possible that NES 
respondents feel a greater need to justify their employment status or welfare receipt whenever 
asked. 
In Panel (C) we analyze the heterogeneity in justification bias by individuals’ education 
(university degree versus lower qualifications). A priori, it is unclear whether education level 
is correlated with justification bias positively or negatively. Because justification process 
involves cognitive effort, individuals with a higher cognitive ability and thus educational 
attainment may be more likely to misreport their disability status. On the other hand, education 
is correlated with social class and individuals of higher social standing may feel less pressure 
to justify their non-employment. The results support the latter hypothesis. We find that 
justification bias is limited to the individuals with lower levels of education. These results are 
consistent with Kreider (1999) who find substantial over-reporting of work limitations among 
blue collar workers but no evidence of over-reporting among white collar workers. 
In the final panel (D) of Table 6 we explore heterogeneity by the unemployment rate in 
an individual’s local area. The pressure to justify one’s unemployment status may be less severe 
in areas where unemployment is higher and seen as a ‘norm’, rather than as a personal failure. 
The results show that there are only small differences across high and low unemployment areas, 
with inconsistent patterns across genders. The effects are slightly larger for men living in high 
unemployment areas, and are slightly lower for women living in high unemployment areas. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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The last two decades has seen the number of disability pension recipients more than double in 
Australia (Broadway et al. 2014), with similarly worrying trends in the United States (Liebman 
2015). Notably, the increase has been especially large for hard-to-verify impairments such as 
back pain and mental health problems (Liebman 2015). Consequently, the Australian 
government has recognized that “many new applications for the disability pension are not 
triggered by the acquisition of an impairment or disability, but by changes in an individual’s 
employment circumstances” (Macklin 2009). In a similar way, an individual’s employment 
circumstances can trigger an increase in reported levels of impairment or disability in 
household surveys. This may be due to financial incentives, but is likely also driven by a social 
desire to justify non-employment or welfare receipt to the interviewer. The presence of 
justification bias is problematic in research that relies on self-reported disability (Lindeboom 
and Kerkhofs 2009) due to the bias it generates in the estimated relationships between health 
and employment status. Nonetheless, self-reported disability remains an important survey 
measure of an individual’s capacity to work (Bound 1991).  
Our study provides new evidence on the existence and magnitude of justification bias 
using a novel feature of the HILDA panel dataset that allows us to test whether increasing the 
salience of an individual’s employment circumstances increases the threshold for equating poor 
health with a limiting disability. Each wave, respondents are asked an identical disability 
question twice by the same interviewer, under the same conditions, within approximately 30 
minutes. In between the two questions, respondents are asked questions about their 
employment status and income sources. Through this process, the treated individuals’ 
affiliation with their employment-related identity is increased (made more salient), causing 
their behavior to shift towards that identity’s norms, such as a disability norm for out-of-the-
labor-force (OLF) men (Benjamin et al., 2016).  
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We formally identify justification bias using a within-individual fixed effects (FE) 
approach and control for a range of individual characteristics and interview conditions. This 
approach, which identifies the effects from respondents who have had a change in employment 
status, strengthens our ability to isolate justification bias from other sources of reporting 
heterogeneity. We find that non-employed respondents and disability pension recipients are 
significantly more likely to misreport or exaggerate their level of disability. For example, we 
find that conditional on responses to the disability question at the beginning of the interview, 
unemployed and OLF males are 3.1 and 6.6 percentage points respectively more likely to report 
a disability at the end of the interview than are employed males. The effects of non-employment 
on misreporting of disability are generally smaller for females, but still statistically significant. 
We also find that individuals receiving a disability support pension, including those who are 
employed, are more likely to exaggerate their disability. For example, employed males 
receiving a disability pension are 9.3 percentage points more likely to report a disability than 
are employed males not receiving a disability pension. However, estimated effects are still 
substantial and statistically significant for unemployed and OLF respondents not receiving 
pensions.  
Self-reported disability will continue to be a practical and informative measure of 
disability in large surveys; however, we demonstrate that the ordering of questions can have a 
considerable impact on the reporting of health limitations. Our results show that when a 
question about having a limiting disability is preceded by questions about employment history, 
job search, reasons for not working, and pension receipt, individuals have an incentive to 
change their threshold for equating poor health with a disability, and this incentive differs 
systematically by employment status. Therefore, to minimize problems associated with 
justification bias, future surveys should position disability and health questions before 
questions related to employment and income. Researchers that use surveys where this ordering 
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has not been achieved need to carefully weigh the merits of using disability measures that are 
affected by justification bias.   
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Figure 1: Proportions of males and females who change their self-reported disability status between 
questionnaires 1 and 2, by employment status 
  
Note: Samples consist of respondents aged 18-60 for whom we have two self-reported measures of disability.  
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Table 1: Reported disability rates across questions, genders and employment states 
 Male  Female 
 All E U OLF  All E U OLF 
Self-report in Q1 0.200 0.141 0.407 0.692  0.195 0.137 0.288 0.368 
Self-report in Q2 0.219 0.156 0.446 0.737  0.216 0.153 0.322 0.401 
Individuals 4,538 4,179 867 616  6,050 5,117 1,881 2,298 
Observations 22,957 19,662 1,618 1,677  35,644 25,333 3,967 6,344 
Note: Figures are sample means calculated using our estimation sample of respondents aged 18-60 for whom we have two 
self-reported measures of disability. The employment status categories are: employed (E), unemployed (U) and out of the 
labor force (OLF). 
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Table 2: Average marginal effect estimates from multinomial logit models of disability status recorded 
in questionnaires 1 and 2 
  Males     Females   
 No-Yes Yes-No  No-Yes Yes-No 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Unemployed 0.021*** 0.001  0.023*** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.002) 
Out of Labor Force 0.034*** 0.002  0.019*** -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.002) 
Age 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Has children 0.000 -0.001  -0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) 
Married/Partnered 0.003 -0.002  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Born in Australia 0.011*** 0.000  0.001 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) 
University degree -0.019*** -0.001  -0.007*** -0.004** 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) 
Suspicious/Non-cooperative 0.007 -0.002  0.014** -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.006) 
Comprehension issues 0.026*** -0.001  0.014** 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.005) 
Q2 interview length/10 0.007*** 0.000  0.008*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Follow up interview 0.006 -0.004  -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003) 
More than 4 calls to household 0.001 -0.007***  -0.004 -0.004** 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 22955 22955  35639 35639 
Notes: No-Yes = No disability in Q1 but disability in Q2. Yes-No = Disability in Q1 but no disability in 
Q2. Presented figures are average marginal effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are 
presented in parentheses. Samples consist of individuals for whom disability in Q1 and Q2 are self-
reported. All regressions additionally control for year effects. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Fixed-effects linear regression models of disability status recorded in questionnaire 2 
  Males     Females   
 
Any 
Disability 
Work-
Limiting  
Any 
Disability 
Work-
Limiting 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
(A) Unemployed 0.031*** 0.045***  0.022*** 0.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.005) 
     Out of Labor Force 0.066*** 0.090***  0.026*** 0.038*** 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.006) (0.005) 
     Self-Reported Q1 Disability 0.538*** 0.454***  0.590*** 0.531*** 
 (0.011) (0.014)  (0.009) (0.011) 
      
(B) Unemployed - No DSP 0.023** 0.037***  0.020*** 0.028*** 
 (0.010) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.006) 
     Out of Labor Force - No DSP 0.064*** 0.089***  0.022*** 0.033*** 
 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.006) (0.006) 
     Employed - Receive DSP 0.093*** 0.147***  0.047 0.081*** 
 (0.023) (0.026)  (0.030) (0.030) 
     Unemployed - Receive DSP  0.144*** 0.192***  0.109*** 0.154*** 
 (0.026) (0.027)  (0.019) (0.020) 
     Out of Labor Force - Receive    
     DSP 0.142*** 0.194***  0.103*** 0.143*** 
 (0.024) (0.025)  (0.016) (0.017) 
     Self-reported Q1 disability 0.536*** 0.449***  0.588*** 0.526*** 
 (0.011) (0.014)  (0.009) (0.011) 
Observations 22955 21320  35639 33424 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level are presented in parentheses. Samples consist of 
individuals for whom disability in Q1 and Q2 are self-reported. DSP = Disability Support Pension. All 
regressions control for a quadratic function in age, marital status, having dependent children, interview 
conditions (suspicious about the study or uncooperative; problems during interview; interviewed in 
follow-up fieldwork period; more than four calls to complete all interviews; and length of the interview), 
and year effects. In Models (1) and (3) the outcome variable equals one if the respondent reports having 
a disability in Q2 and zero otherwise. In Models (2) and (4) the work limiting disability outcome variable 
equals one if the respondent reports a work limiting disability in Q2 and zero if the respondent does not 
have a disability; individuals reporting non-work limiting disability are not included for the estimations 
of these models. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Fixed-effects linear regression models of disability status recorded in questionnaire 2 using the 
sample of respondents with partner-reported disability status in questionnaire 1 
  Males     Females   
 
Any 
Disability 
Work-
Limiting 
 
Any 
Disability 
Work-
Limiting 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
(A) Unemployed 0.033** 0.049***  0.022 0.034** 
 (0.014) (0.013)  (0.015) (0.013) 
     Out of Labor Force 0.083*** 0.110***  0.031*** 0.041*** 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.011) (0.010) 
     Partner-Reported Q1 Disability 0.417*** 0.327***  0.438*** 0.379*** 
 (0.013) (0.015)  (0.017) (0.019) 
      
(B) Unemployed - No DSP 0.022 0.039***  0.018 0.029** 
 (0.015) (0.014)  (0.015) (0.013) 
     Out of Labor Force - No DSP 0.091*** 0.119***  0.033*** 0.042*** 
 (0.021) (0.021)  (0.011) (0.010) 
     Employed - Receive DSP 0.060* 0.130***  0.010 0.024 
 (0.033) (0.035)  (0.057) (0.055) 
     Unemployed - Receive DSP  0.144*** 0.189***  0.078* 0.124** 
 (0.037) (0.039)  (0.046) (0.048) 
     Out of Labor Force - Receive  
     DSP 
0.118*** 0.177***  0.020 0.065* 
 (0.026) (0.029)  (0.038) (0.038) 
     Partner-reported Q1 disability 0.416*** 0.324***  0.438*** 0.378*** 
 (0.013) (0.015)  (0.017) (0.019) 
Observations 18872 17379  12035 11247 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level are presented in parentheses. Samples consist of 
individuals for whom disability in Q1 is partner-reported and Q2 is self-reported. DSP = Disability 
Support Pension. All regressions control for a quadratic function in age, having dependent children, 
interview conditions (suspicious about the study or uncooperative; problems during interview; 
interviewed in follow-up fieldwork period; more than four calls to complete all interviews; and length of 
the interview), and year effects. In Models (1) and (3) the outcome variable equals one if the respondent 
reports having a disability in Q2 and zero otherwise. In Models (2) and (4) the work limiting disability 
outcome variable equals one if the respondent reports a work limiting disability in Q2 and zero if the 
respondent does not have a disability; individuals reporting non-work limiting disability are not included 
for the estimations of these models. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Fixed-effects linear regression models of specific health conditions reported in 
questionnaire 2 
  
Mental  
Health 
Conditiona 
Limited  
Use of   
Limbsb 
Condition 
Restricting    
Phys. Activityc 
Chronic or 
Recurring  
Paind 
Hearing  
& Sight 
Problemse 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(A) Males      
Unemployed 0.019** 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.020*** -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Out of Labor Force 0.073*** 0.047*** 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Self-reported Q1 disability 0.218*** 0.265*** 0.371*** 0.269*** 0.242*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Sample mean 0.041 0.051 0.085 0.054 0.046 
Observations 15659 15853 16524 15918 15765 
(B) Females      
Unemployed 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.013** 0.009** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Out of Labor Force 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Self-reported Q1 disability 0.361*** 0.318*** 0.427*** 0.360*** 0.222*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Sample mean 0.051 0.050 0.081 0.057 0.026 
Observations 24611 24566 25503 24785 23869 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at individual level) are presented in parentheses. The sample consists of individuals 
for whom disability in Q1 and Q2 are self-reported. In each model (1) to (5), the outcome variable equals one if the 
respondent reports having the health condition of interest in Q2 and zero if the respondent reports no disability in Q2; 
individuals reporting conditions other than the condition of interest are not used for the estimation of the model. All 
regressions control for a quadratic function in age, marital status, having dependent children, interview conditions 
(suspicious about the study or uncooperative; problems during interview; interviewed in follow-up fieldwork period; 
more than four calls to complete all interviews; and length of the interview), and year effects.  a “A nervous or 
emotional condition which requires treatment” or “Any mental illness which requires help or supervision”. b “Limited 
use of arms or fingers”, “Difficulty gripping things” or “limited use of feet or legs.” c “Any condition that restricts 
physical activity or physical work (e.g. back problems, migraines).” d “Chronic or recurring pain.” e “Hearing problems” 
and “Sight problems not corrected by glasses or contact lenses”. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Exploring heterogeneity – fixed-effects linear regression models of disability status recorded in 
questionnaire 2  
  (1) Males     (2) Females   
 Unemployed OLF  Unemployed OLF 
(A) Age < 40 0.030** 0.094***  0.019** 0.017** 
 (0.014) (0.027)  (0.008) (0.007) 
      Age ≥ 40 0.032** 0.058***  0.027*** 0.037*** 
 (0.013) (0.015)  (0.009) (0.009) 
      
(B) Born in NES country -0.001 0.037  0.019 0.029* 
 (0.023) (0.034)  (0.015) (0.017) 
      Born in ES country 0.036*** 0.070***  0.023*** 0.025*** 
 (0.011) (0.014)  (0.007) (0.006) 
      
(C) University degree 0.006 0.007  0.006 0.019 
 (0.017) (0.028)  (0.012) (0.011) 
      No university degree 0.038*** 0.080***  0.026*** 0.028*** 
 (0.011) (0.015)  (0.007) (0.007) 
      
(D) Low unemployment area 0.030** 0.058***  0.032*** 0.029*** 
 (0.014) (0.016)  (0.009) (0.007) 
      High unemployment area 0.032*** 0.073***  0.016** 0.023*** 
 (0.012) (0.015)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 22957   35644  
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level are presented in parentheses. Samples consist of 
individuals for whom disability in Q1 and Q2 are self-reported. NES= Non English Speaking; ES= 
English Speaking. Low unemployment area is defined as below the sample median. All regressions 
control for self-reported Q1 disability, a quadratic function in age, marital status, having dependent 
children, interview conditions (suspicious about the study or uncooperative; problems during interview; 
interviewed in follow-up fieldwork period; more than four calls to complete all interviews; and length of 
the interview), and year effects. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
 
